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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the synergy created in the merger process, its sources and factors that 
influence its magnitude using a sample of 56 mergers from U.S. industries completed within 
1992-1997. Research findings indicate that mergers are resulting in the synergy gains, which 
is measured by operating cash flows relative to the industries. The cash flow increases do not 
come from gaining monopoly position and cutting capital investments and labor cost. The 
cash flow improvements come from the more productive usage of assets in generating sales. 
The subsample studies show that cash flow improvements are particularly strong in high 
overlap, equity-financed, value and larger merger subsamples.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial literature suggests that merger decision may be the result of one or more of the 
following motives: synergy, agency, and hubris. The synergy motive implies that merging 
firms expect synergetic gains that result by merging the resources of the two firms. The gains 
may arise from various sources, such as: potential reductions in production or distribution 
costs, realization of economies of scale, vertical integration, adoption of more efficient 
production or organizational technology, increased market power in product markets, 
increased utilization of the acquirer’s management team, reduction of agency costs by 
bringing organization-specific assets under common ownership, elimination of inefficient 
target management, the use of underutilized tax shields, avoidance of bankruptcy costs, 
increased leverage, other types of tax advantages. Synergy motive predicts that the combined 
firm generates cash flows with a present value in excess of the sum of the market values of 
the bidding and target firms.  
 
The agency motive, which is based on the agency theory, suggests that takeover occurs since 
managerial motives dominate takeover market and acquirer’s management enhances its 
welfare at the expense of acquirer shareholders. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers may 
undertake acquisitions simply to increase the sizes of their firms, since managerial 
compensation and power often increase with the level of sources under a manager’s control. 
Shleifer and Vyshny (1989) however, suggest that managers may undertake acquisitions of 
firms for which they would be the best possible managers for the purpose of enabling them to 
attract higher compensation from their shareholders and increase their job security. They 
suggest that management might acquire firms that enhance the dependence of the firm on 
their own skills even though such announcement acquisitions might reduce the value of the 
firm. Harris (1994) suggest that although a firm’s shareholders are likely to be better off if 
their firm is the target rather than the acquirer, the firm’s manager, may be better off if his 
firm is the acquirer, since the target’s manager usually losses his job following a takeover, 
whereas the acquirer’s manager usually retains his. According to Harris’s model, a manager’s 
fear that the firm with which his firm can create synergy gains will take over his firm, if his 
firm does not take it over, makes him want his firm to be acquirer. 
 
The hubris hypothesis suggests that managers make mistakes in evaluating target firms, and 
engage in acquisitions even when there is no synergy (Roll, 1985). It is most likely because 
acquirer companies overestimate their abilities to manage an acquisition. The hubris 
hypothesis relies on the perfect form of market efficiency. In the case of strong-form efficient 
markets no gains from the takeover could be observed, since these takeovers do not bring any 
operational or financial synergy and doesn’t bring a solution to agency problems (since there 
is not any agency problem).  
 
Financial literature provides evidence that merged firms show significant improvements in 
postmerger cash flows. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine the post-acquisition 
operating performance of merged firms using a sample of the 50 largest mergers between 
U.S. public industrial firms completed in the period 1979 to mid-1984. They have found 
significant improvements in operating cash flow returns after the merger, resulting from 
increase in asset productivity relative to their industries. 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to study the magnitude of the synergy created in the 
merger process and specify successful merger types. For this purpose, we collected a sample 
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of 56 mergers between U.S. public industrial firms completed between 1992 and 1997. We 
establish two-staged variable analysis model. In the first stage, we measure where there is 
synergy postmerger. We used experimental design to measure postmerger performance 
improvements of surviving firms, following Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992). Our cash 
flow measures are industry-adjusted and unaffected by the method of payment and the 
method of accounting of transaction.  
 
The present study provides validity check of the study of Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) in 
a unique time setting. Our merger sample that covers 1992-1998 period is unique and has not 
been analyzed in the previous researches in empirical literature. This period is characterized 
as a heavy merger wave period in U.S. industries. The U.S. industries were forced to 
restructure themselves in these years due to technological developments, growing 
competition, and pressure from demand side. The merger patterns and anticipated gains 
varied considerably across industries. 
 
Media, telecommunications and computer industries were involved in heavy takeover 
activities as a result of swiftly evolving digital technology, which was driving these industries 
together. The primarily two technological advances; digitization and fiber optics, were 
converging these industries on the “information superway”. The distinctions between 
telephones, televisions and computers were starting to blur as a result of digital technologies. 
The broken monopoly of telecommunications firms in the USA, pushed firms to merge in 
order to be competitive and to offer customers every sort of telephony: local, long-distance, 
and Internet access. Geographical market expansion desires were another motivation of 
mergers in these industries.  
 
The computer industry was trying to challenge the growing power of Microsoft in the 
software market, by merger and joint ventures. A wave of intelligent, handheld devices, 
running non-Microsoft software attracted almost all of the computer companies and pushed 
them to takeovers. The defense industry was trying to restructure itself in the face of 
Pentagon’s intention to reduce the budget allocated to defense expenditures, which would 
result in smaller number of integrated suppliers. The pharmaceutical industry was going to be 
vertically integrated. The drug companies were merging with pharmacy benefit management 
companies, middlemen with massive buying power that provide prescription drugs for their 
insured customers at knockdown prices. 
 
Our research findings favor synergy theory of the mergers. It is found that merged firms show 
significant improvements in operating cash flows relative to their industries postmerger, 
resulting from increases in asset productivity relative to their industries. Postmerger cash flow 
improvements do not come at the expense of the long-term performance and do not reflect 
wealth transfer from other stakeholders to shareholders. This result suggests that postmerger 
cash flow improvements can be attributed to the synergy resulting from merger. 
 
The subsample analyses show that high overlap, equity-financed mergers experience 
significantly higher cash flows whereas low overlap and mixed-financed mergers fails to 
perform better after merger. In the other hand, it is found that bidders with high price-to-book 
ratios are motivated by hubris. Their mergers fail to create additional value, whereas bidders 
with low price-to-book ratios are more prudent in their merger decisions. The combined size 
of bidder and targets are found to be effective on the postmerger performance of the mergers. 
Significant improvements in cash flows are observed in bigger mergers, whereas smaller 
mergers do not experience significant cash flow improvements after merger.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes sample and data used 
in the study. Section III describes the research methodology. Section IV analyzes postmerger 
performance of merged firms. Section V discusses previous empirical research and compares 
the research findings. Section VI gives a brief conclusion.  
 
 
II. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
We collected a sample of mergers between 1992 and 1997. The source of the merger data is 
Mergerstat. The primary database consists of 629 merger bids meeting the below-mentioned 
restrictions; 
 
1. There is a merger offer to purchase stock in the company.  
2. The details of the offer appear in Mergerstat.  
3. Transaction date lies between 1992 and 1997.  
4. Transactions valued at less than $ 350 million were eliminated. Banks, insurance, and 
railroad companies were eliminated, since they are subject to different regulations.  
5. Country of bidders and targets is the USA. Acquisitions by foreign concerns were 
eliminated.  
6. The deals that did not obtain complete ownership of the target were eliminated.  
7. The mergers that were later cancelled were eliminated. 
 
From this primary database we select our sample according to the following criteria:  
 
8. The acquiring company is required to have at least, three years premerger and two 
years postmerger financial and market data available on the Compustat tapes, whereas 
the requirement for the target company is three years premerger financial and market 
data.  
9. The size of target should exceed 5% of the size of acquirer. Target firm size is 
computed from Compustat as the market value of common stock plus the net debt and 
preferred stock at the beginning of the year before the acquisition.  
10. Some companies are involved in more than one merger bid. The merger cases 
involving these bidder firms are eliminated from the analysis, since there are 
distorting effects of crossing merger cases.  
 
These selection criteria reduce our initial sample of 629 merger cases to 56. This sample size 
is satisfactory for the analysis purposes. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) conducted the 
postmerger performance analysis with 50 cases, whereas this number was 38 in Clark, and 
Ofek (1994).  
 
Summary statistics for aggregate, average, and median deal size and total number of mergers 
according to calendar years are reported in Table 1. The last two years capture more than half 
of the total number and aggregate dollar value of mergers. Average deal size is 2,983 million 
dollars, whereas median deal size is 1,169 million dollars. The average and median deal sizes 
suggest that the study is focused on larger mergers.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for aggregate, average, and median deal size and total number of mergers  
according to calendar years in 56 merger cases over the period 1992-1997. 
Year Total  
Number of Mergers 
Aggregate Deal Size 
(Million Dollars) 
Average Deal Size 
(Million Dollars) 
Median Deal Size 
(Million Dollars) 
1992 3 1,222 407 406 
1993 6 14,213 2,369 1,154 
1994 5 4,410 882 828 
1995 13 46,607 3,585 1,440 
1996 15 83,735 5,582 2,184 
1997 14 16,872 1,205 772 
Total 56 167,059 2,983 1,169 
 
The source of the financial and market data is Compustat (North American).  
 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
 
3.1. Testable Predictions  
 
Since our primary objective is to test whether there are any performance improvements after 
the merger, we examine the cash flow, profitability, operating efficiency, output, and capital 
investment variables. Specifically, we test the hypotheses that mergers (1) increase the 
surviving firm’s cash flow, (2) increase the surviving firm’s cash flow margin, (3) increase 
surviving firm’s asset productivity, (4) increase surviving firm’s operational efficiency, (5) 
increase surviving firm’s capital spending, (6) decrease surviving firm’s employment cost. 
Table 2 presents our testable predictions and the empirical proxies we employ. The testable 
predictions are held in the similar line with the study of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) in 
order to provide comparable results. 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Testable Predictions 
This table details the economic characteristics we examine for changes resulting from mergers. We also 
present and define the empirical proxies we employ in our analyses. The index symbols POST and PRE 
in the predicted relationship column stand for postmerger and premerger, respectively.  
   
Variable Proxies Predicted Relationships 
   
Return on Assets (ROA) = EBITD /Total Assets  ROApost>ROApre Cash Flow 
Return on Equity (ROE) = EBITD /Total Equity  ROEpost>ROEpre 
 
Asset Turnover (AT) = Sales/Total Assets  
 
ATpost>ATpre Cash Flow 
Components Return on Sales (ROS) = EBITD /Sales ROSpost>ROSpre 
   
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) = Sales/Total Employment SALEFFpost>SALEFFpre Operating 
Efficiency EBITD Efficiency (NIEFF) = EBITD/Total Employment NIEFFpost>NIEFFpre 
 
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA) = Capital 
Expenditure/Sales 
CESApost>CESApre Capital 
investment 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets (CETA) = Capital 
Expenditure/Total Assets  
CETApost>CETApre 
   
Employment 
Cost 
Pension Expense Per Employee (PEE) = Pension 
Expense/Employee 
PEEpost<PEEpre 
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3.2. Variables  
 
We use two different cash flow variables to measure improvements in operating performance. 
We use EBITD deflated by the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value 
of net debt), and total equity (market value of equity) to provide a return metric that is 
comparable across firms.  
 
The market value of assets, measured at the beginning of the year, is the market value of 
equity plus the book values of net debt and preferred stock. We define EBITD, measured over 
the year, as sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus 
depreciation and goodwill expenses. This measure excludes the effect of depreciation, 
goodwill, interest expense and income, and taxes. It is therefore unaffected by the method of 
accounting for the merger (purchase or pooling accounting) and the method of financing 
(cash, mixed or equity). As discussed in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) these factors 
make it difficult to compare traditional accounting returns of the merged firm over time and 
cross-sectionally.  
 
We exclude the change in equity values of the target and acquiring firms at the merger 
announcement from the asset base in the postmerger years. For the target and acquirer, the 
change in equity values is measured on the beginning of the month before the bid offer is 
announced to the date the target is deleted from Compustat, which is regarded as the delisting 
date from trading on public exchanges. In an efficient stock market these revaluations 
represent the capitalized value of any expected postmerger performance improvements. If 
merger announcement equity revaluations are included in the asset base, measured cash flow 
returns will not show any abnormal increase, even though the merger results in increase in 
operating cash flows.  
 
If there are improvements in cash flow returns in the postmerger period, it can arise from a 
variety of sources. These include improvements in cash flow margins and greater asset 
productivity. Cash flow margin, which is EBITD on sales, measures the pretax operating cash 
flows generated per sales dollar. Asset turnover measures the sales dollars generated from 
each dollar of investment in assets (market value of the assets). The variables are defined so 
that their product equals to the EBITD on total assets, first cash flow variable. 
 
Operating efficiency variables primarily deal with the increased usage of labor to produce 
more output. Sales and EBITD on total employment provide a measure to test the 
improvements in operating efficiency.  
 
Improvements in cash flows may be achieved by focusing on short-term performance 
improvements at the expense of the long-liability of the firm. To assess whether the merged 
firms focus on short-term performance improvements at the expense of long-term 
investments, we examine their capital investments. Two empirical proxies are employed to 
measure capital investments; capital expenditures to sales and capital expenditures to total 
assets (market value of the assets).  
 
Mergers give the acquirer an opportunity to renegotiate explicit and implicit contracts to 
lower labor costs and achieve a more efficient mix of capital and labor. Because we are 
unable to obtain sufficient data on wages directly, we examine pension expense per employee 
to analyze changes in labor costs in years surrounding the mergers. However, the caution 
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should be made in the interpretation of this variable, since this variable suffers from 
identification problem. Firms may not be as flexible in their pension expenses as they would 
be in their direct compensation contracts.  
 
 
3.3 Performance Benchmark  
 
We aggregate performance data of the target and bidding firms before the merger to obtain 
the premerger performance of the combined firms. In the calculation of variables for 
premerger years total assets, sales, EBITD, capital expenditures, pension expenses, and 
number of employees are taken as the sum of the values for the target and acquiring firms. 
The variable values of surviving firm are used in the postmerger years. 
 
Comparing the postmerger performance with this premerger benchmark provides a measure 
of the change in the performance. But economic factors have much effect on the postmerger 
performance of the merged firms and some of the difference between the premerger and 
postmerger performance could be due to economywide and industry factors, prior to a 
continuation of firm-specific performance before the merger. Hence, we use industry-adjusted 
performance of the target and bidding firms as our primary benchmark to evaluate postmerger 
performance. 
 
Industry-adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the industry median from the 
sample firm value for each year and firm. we use Compustat SIC industry definitions, and 
exclude the target and acquiring firms’ values from the industry median value computations. 
Industry values for the sample firms are constructed by weighing median performance 
measures for the target and acquiring firms’ industries by the relative asset sizes of bidder and 
target at the beginning year of the merger announcement. 
 
At last, but not least, a caution should be made on the synergy assumption utilized in the 
present study. The synergy assumption of the current study is that if the synergy effect is 
present, the total cash flows of merged firms will be greater than the simple sum of cash 
flows of the parts that is bidder and target firms. Research findings should be interpreted 
within this window, since if the synergy assumption is incorrect, then the pre-merger period 
would be misrepresented by the mere summation of the two firms. 
 
 
3.4. Research Methodology 
 
To test the research predictions, we first compute empirical proxies for every company for a 
seven-year period: three years before through three years after mergers. we then calculate the 
median of each variable for each firm over pre- and postmerger windows (premerger= years –
3 to –1; postmerger = years +1 to +3). Year 0, the year of the merger, is excluded from the 
analysis since the variable values for this year are not comparable across firms and for 
industry comparisons.  
 
Having computed industry-adjusted pre- and postmerger medians, we use the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test as our principal method of testing for significant changes in the 
variables following Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994). The financial ratios do 
not follow normal distribution, making it difficult to interpret the findings of the parametric 
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analysis. The small sample sizes in subsample analyses, also, lead to the selection of 
nonparametric tests as a suitable method of testing postmerger performance improvements. 
 
We base our conclusions on the standardized test statistic Z, which for samples of at least 10 
follows approximately a standard normal distribution. In addition to the Wilcoxon test, we 
use a (binomial) proportion test to determine whether the proportion (p) of firms experiencing 
changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing 
whether p = 0.5). Given the wide variance in firms, and industries, finding that an 
overwhelming proportion of firms changed performance in the same direction may be at least 
as informative as a finding concerning the median change in performance. 
 
 
3.5. Subsample Analysis 
 
In addition to analyzing the full sample of merged companies, we perform similar tests for 
below mentioned subsamples. The percentage distribution of the subsamples is provided in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Distribution of Subsamples 
This table details the absolute and percentage distribution of subsamples defined in the body part of the 
text. Total 56 merger cases present in the total sample of this study. 
   
Variable Number Percentage  
   
Business Overlap Subsets   
High Overlap 33 59 % 
Medium Overlap 4 7 % 
Low Overlap 19 34 % 
   
Method of Payment Subsets    
Cash 12 21 % 
Mixed 11 20 % 
Equity  33 59 % 
   
Value-Growth Subsets   
Value  17 30 % 
Growth   39 70 % 
Combined Size Subsets   
Small 28 50 % 
Big 28 50 % 
 
 
1. Business Overlap Subsamples: Theoretical financial literature suggests that strategy is 
an important determinant of the improvements in the postmerger performance, 
therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that mergers by firms that have overlapping 
businesses will show greater cash flow improvements than mergers between firms 
with no overlap. we examine this proposition by classifying our sample mergers as 
those with high, medium, and low business overlap between the target and acquiring 
firms. High overlap mergers are merger cases between those bidder and target firms 
whose at least three first SIC Code numbers are the same, whereas in medium overlap 
mergers the first two SIC Code numbers similar. The remaining mergers are classified 
as low overlap mergers. Sample analysis show that 33 (59%) out of 56 mergers are 
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high overlap mergers, whereas 4 (7%) cases are medium overlap and 19 (34%) cases 
are low overlap mergers. 
 
2. Method of Payment Subsamples:  The method of payment of financing is frequently 
cited as important to the ultimate success of mergers. The effect of method of payment 
is analyzed by dividing total sample to three subsets based on the form of payment. 
The first subset is called equity-financed and includes cases where only the acquirer’s 
common stock was used to pay for an acquisition. The second subset is called cash-
financed and includes cases where only cash was used for payment. The third subset is 
called mixed-financed and includes all other cases in which the payment terms were 
neither pure stock nor pure cash. In some cases, both stock and cash were used and in 
other cases cash and senior securities were used. Sample analysis show that 33 (59%) 
out of 56 mergers are equity-financed mergers, whereas 12 (21%) cases are cash-
financed and 11 (20%) cases are mixed-financed.  
 
3. Value-Growth Subsamples:  Theoretical financial literature suggest that companies 
with high price to book ratios (‘growth’ firms) are more likely to overestimate their 
own abilities to manage an acquisition and motivated by hubris (Rau and Vermaelen 
(1995)). Therefore, the takeovers by growth firms destroy shareholder value. On the 
other hand, companies with low price to book ratios (‘value’ firms) are more prudent 
before approving acquisitions. Since these acquisitions are not motivated by hubris, 
they should create shareholder value. we rank the mergers into separate subsamples 
based on bidders’ price to book ratio relative to their industries’ price to book ratio at 
the beginning of the year of merger announcement. Bidder companies’ price to book 
ratio is compared to the industry’s median price to book ratio in the beginning of the 
year prior to announcement. If bidder companies’ price to book ratio is higher than 
industry’s median price to book ratio book, the merger case is classified as ‘growth’ 
merger, otherwise as “value” merger. As a result of this ranking, 17 (30%) mergers 
appeared to be ‘value’ mergers and 39 (70%) bidders as ‘growth’ mergers. 
 
4. Combined Size Subsamples: we also examine whether the combined size of bidder and 
target influences postmerger performance of the surviving firm, we divide total 
sample to two different subsets according to combined size of the bidder and targets. 
Combined size is calculated as the sum of bidder and target firm sizes in the beginning 
of the year prior to announcement. Total assets are calculated by summing market 
value of equity and book value of total debt and preferred stock. we classify mergers 
as “larger” and “smaller” according to their size relative to the median for all firms in 
the sample. If the combined size of merger is greater than or equal to the calculated 
median of the sample, the merger case is classified as a larger merger, otherwise as a 
smaller merger.  Since merger cases are ranked relative to their median, both subsets 
have an equal number (28 mergers) of merger cases.  
 
 
IV. Empirical Results  
 
In this section we present and discuss our empirical results for the full sample of mergers, and 
for the four subsamples. we first present and discuss our empirical results (in Table 3 and 
Table 4) for the complete sample of 56 mergers. Then we discuss our results for the following 
subsamples of our data: high overlap versus medium overlap versus low overlap mergers 
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(Table 51); cash financed versus mixed financed versus equity-financed mergers (Table 6); 
value versus growth mergers (Table 7); larger versus smaller mergers (Table 8). For each of 
these partitions, we examine and report (in the text and in Tables 5 to 8) whether each 
subsample of firms experience significant changes in the variable values after merger. We 
also test whether the difference between the value changes for the subsamples are significant.  
 
 Cash Flow Changes 
 
Table 3 reports the changes in cash flows in years 1 to 3 relative to the year before merger. 
Firms’ median ROA increase by 0.24% in year 1, decrease by 1.40% in year 2, decrease by 
2.28% in year 3 relative to year -1. It seems that there is downward trend in firm’s cash flows 
in the postmerger period. However, the sample firms’ industries experience decline in cash 
flows also, and this decline is greater than sample firms’. Therefore, industry-adjusted cash 
flows increase by 3.32% in year 1, 1.32% in year 2, and 1.61% in year 3 relative to year -1. 
Apparently, merger-related cash flow improvements are immediately observed following the 
merger.  
 
Table 3 
Median change of variables in postmerger years relative  
to the year before the merger  
This table presents median change of variables in years 1 to 3 relative to the year before the merger 
(year -1). Year –1 value for the combined firms is weighted averages of target and acquirer values, 
with the weights being the relative asset values of the two firms. Postmerger values use data for the 
surviving firms. Industry-adjusted variables are computed for each firm and year as the difference 
between the sample firms’ growth rates in that year and growth rates for variables in the same 
industry. Target and acquirer industry values are weighted by the relative size of the acquirer and 
target firms in year –1. 
Variables Firm Median (%) 
Industry-adjusted 
Median (%) 
Cash Flows   
Return on Assets (ROA)   
Year –1 to 1         0.24 3.32 
Year – 1 to 2 -1.40  1.32 
Year – 1 to 3 -2.28 1.61 
Return on Equity (ROE)   
Year –1 to 1 -1.75 0.66 
Year – 1 to 2 -1.31 -0.65 
Year – 1 to 3 -2.35 -1.22 
 
Another cash flow proxy, ROE, however, shows below-industry performance comparing to 
year –1. Industry-adjusted ROE increases by 0.66 % in year 1, and then decreases by 0.65% 
in year 2, and 1.22% in year 3 relative to year -1.  
 
Table 4 reports that in accordance with research predictions, industry-adjusted ROA increases 
significantly after merger. The industry-adjusted mean (median) increase in ROA after 
merger is 1 percentage points (1 percent) and 61 percent of all firms experience increasing 
ROA after merger. These test statistics are all significant at the 10 percent level2. This result 
suggests that mergers create synergy. Cash flows deflated on the market value of stocks 
(ROE) do not show significant changes after merger.  
 
                                                 
1 Table5 through Table 8 are provided in the appendixe.  
2 Since our hypotheses are unidirectional, we use one-tailed statistical tests.   
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Table 4 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Full Sample of Mergers 
This table presents empirical results for our full sample of mergers. For each empirical proxy we give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, standard deviation 
of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to merger, the mean and median change in the proxy’s value for postmerger versus premerger period, and a test of 
significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this 
change. 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean  
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean  
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Change 
(Mean) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z-Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Cash Flows          
Return on Assets (ROA) 56 0.04 
(0.02) 
0.13 0,05 
(0.03) 
0.12 0.01 
(0.01) 
1.61* 0.61 1.47* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 54 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.08 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.13 0.03 
(0.02) 
1.31* 0.59 0.68 
Cash Flow Components           
          
Return on Sales (ROS) 56 0,03 
(0.04) 
0.33 0.08 
(0.04) 
0.15 0.05 
(0.00) 
0.87 0.55 0.67 
Asset Turnover (AT) 56 -0.06 
(-0.17) 
0.75 0.20 
(-0.04) 
1.09 0.26 
(0.13) 
2.64*** 0.66 2.27** 
Operating Efficiency          
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) 56 67,601 
(24,667) 
147,350 98,668 
(47,709) 
177,587 31,067 
(23,042) 
2.81*** 0.64 2.00** 
EBITD Efficiency (NIEFF) 56 25,945 
(9,481) 
42.825 34,206 
(11,276) 
66,061 8,261 
(1,795) 
2.04** 0.66 2.27** 
Capital Investment          
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA) 55 0.000 
(0.010) 
0.052 0.000 
(0,000) 
0.070 0.000 
(-0.010) 
0.34 0.47 0.54 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CETA) 
55 -0.003 
(-0.007) 
 
0.095 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.055 0.009 
(0.007) 
2.13** 0.71 2.97*** 
Employment Cost          
Pension Expense per Employee (PEE) 45 0.37 
(0.16) 
1.07 0.34 
(0.24) 
1.27 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.32 0.53 0.60 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Interesting pattern is observed across subsamples (Tables 5 to 8). High overlap, equity-
financed, value, and larger merger subsamples show significantly positive cash flow 
improvements, whereas cash flow changes are positive, but not statistically significant for 
remaining subsamples. The percentage of firms that experienced increasing industry-adjusted 
ROA is 64 percent in high overlap, 53 percent in low overlap, 67 percent in equity-financed, 
58 percent in cash-financed, 45 percent in mixed-financed, 76 percent in “value”, 54 percent 
in “growth”, 64 percent in larger, and 57 percent in smaller merger subsamples. This 
conclusion cast doubts on the profitability of mixed-financed and growth mergers.   
 
 
 Cash Flow Components  
 
Cash flow increases may stem from two sources: increasing cash flow margin or increasing 
asset turnover. Our results in table 4 suggest that the main source of the observed cash flow 
increase is increasing asset productivity. Asset turnover increased significantly for postmerger 
period showing 26 percentage points (13 percent) industry-adjusted mean (median) increase 
and 66 percent of all firms experience increasing ROE after merger. The Wilcoxon and 
proportion test statistics are significant at 5 percent level. 
 
Cash flow margins do not change significantly after merger (Table 4). The industry-adjusted 
mean (median) change in return on sales (ROE) after merger is not significant.  
 
From tables 5 to 8, it is evident that all of the subsamples except cash-financed and smaller 
merger subsets experience significantly increasing asset turnover. Cash flow margin do not 
show significant increases in any of the subsamples. This result suggests that merger benefits 
are primarily gained through realizing more sales dollars per asset dollar more than gaining 
market power through increased sales margins.  
 
 
 Operational Efficiency Changes 
 
Financial literature predicts that merger of two companies will help these firms to employ 
their human, financial, and technological resources more efficiently. Both of the operating 
efficiency measures we employ, industry-adjusted sales per employee (SALEFF) and net cash 
flow per employee (NIEFF), show significant median increases following merger for the full 
sample. From table 4, it is evident that sales per employee go from a premerger industry-
adjusted average (median) 67,601 USD (24,667 USD) to postmerger industry-adjusted 
average (median) 98,668 USD (47,709 USD). Net cash flow per employee also shows 
significant increase; industry-adjusted premerger mean (median) 25,945 USD (9,481 USD) 
goes to 34,206 USD (11,276 USD). Further, SALEFF and NIEFF increase in 64 and 66 
percent of all cases, significant at the 5 percent levels.  
 
 Subsample study (Tables 5 to 8) shows that operating efficiency improves in all of the 
subsamples except cash- and mixed-financed, value, and large merger subsets. These results 
are surprising in terms of value and larger merger subsamples, since these subsamples 
experience significantly improving cash flow changes.  
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 Capital Investment 
 
We compute capital investment intensity using two proxies, capital expenditure divided by 
sales (CESA) and capital expenditures divided by total assets (CETA). The CESA measure is 
not statistically significant according to both the Wilcoxon and proportion tests, but CETA, 
shows significant increases on both tests (Table 4). On average (median), our sample firms 
increase industry-adjusted capital investment relative to total assets by 0.9 percentage points 
(0.7 percent), from industry-adjusted CETA –0.3 percent (-0.7 percent) premerger to 
industry-adjusted CETA 0.6 percent (0 percent) postmerger, and 71 percent of all firms 
increase CETA after merger. The Wilcoxon test statistics (2.13) significant at the five percent 
level, whereas proportion test statistics significant at the one percent level. The results suggest 
that companies do not cut their long-term investment in order to increase their short-term cash 
flows.  
 
Capital investment hasn’t been cut significantly across subsamples (Tables 5 to 8), even it 
increased significantly in high overlap, equity-financed, value, and large merger subsamples. 
These results suggest that merging firms are investing in their long-term perspective along 
with short- and medium-term profitability.  
 
 
 Employment Cost 
 
One of the expected effects of the merger is decline in the employment cost, since mergers 
allow renegotiation of employment contracts. Even if there are contractions in employment 
cost, it does not refer to synergy gains of mergers. This phenomenon mostly states wealth 
transfer from employers to shareholders.  
 
We find that pension expense per employee (PEE) does not change significantly for 
postmerger period (Table 4). Subsample analyses do not detect any significant decreases in 
PEE across subsamples (Tables 5 to 8). These results should be interpreted with caution, 
since this variable suffers from identification problem. Firms may not be as flexible in their 
pension expenses as they would be in their direct compensation contracts.  
 
 
V. COMPARISON WITH PRIOR RESEARCHES 
 
There are a number of researches conducted on the postmerger performance of the merged 
firms in the empirical literature. Lev and Mandelker (1972) find that the long-run profitability 
of acquiring firms is somewhat higher than that of comparable nonmerging firms. However, 
acquiring firms experience a decrease in growth rate in the postmerger period compared with 
nonmerging firms. Authors relate this phenomenon to a “shakedown” or “digestion” effect. 
Nevertheless, this study suffers serious methodological problems (Reid (1973)).  
 
Clark and Ofek (1994) examine a sample of takeovers occurring between 1981 and 1988 
identified as being attempts to restructure distressed targets. They used performance 
indicators that focus on postmerger performance of both combined firms and target alone to 
test whether the combination of bidder and target is a successful method of restructuring the 
target. All of the performance measures indicate that the mergers are not successful. 20 out of 
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the 38 restructuring attempts are classified as failed attempts, nine as marginally successful, 
and nine as successful in this study.  
 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine the post-acquisition operating performance of 
merged firms using a sample of the 50 largest mergers between U.S. public industrial firms 
completed in the period 1979 to mid-1984. Their findings are in the same line with the 
findings of current study. The merged firms are found have significant improvements in 
operating cash flow returns after the merger, resulting from increase in asset productivity 
relative to their industries. These improvements were particularly strong for transactions 
involving firms in overlapping businesses. Sample firms maintain their capital expenditure 
and R&D rates relative to their industries after the merger. 
 
The results of the present study are directly comparable and in the same line with that of 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992). Our findings approves the validity of their findings in 
different time setting, though, adding some new insights about the mergers of growth and 
value firms which is consistent with the performance extrapolation hypothesis of Rau and 
Vermaelen (1995), which states that takeovers by growth firms destroy shareholder value 
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our empirical analysis of postmerger performance of surviving firms provides support to 
natural selection hypothesis. Our findings indicate that surviving firms show significant 
improvements in operating cash flows relative to their industries after the merger, resulting 
from increases in asset productivity relative to their industries. The improvements are 
particularly strong in high overlap, equity-financed, value and larger merger subsamples. 
Cash flow margins apparently stay unchanged. This suggests that postmerger performance 
improvements are not due to the market power gains. Postmerger performance improvements 
feed from improved operating efficiency. Merging firms are investing in their long-term 
perspective as well instead of focusing only on their short-term cash flows. The postmerger 
cash glow improvements do not reflect wealth transfer from employers to shareholders, since 
mergers do not lead to employment cost cuts. These findings suggest that mergers create 
additional value or to put it differently merger result in the creation of fitter species (firms). 
 
Consistent with research predictions, high overlap mergers are found to experience strong and 
statistically significant cash flow improvements whereas low overlap mergers fails to improve 
their cash flows significantly. This result suggests that bidders are more inclined to utilize 
merger-related synergies in intra-industry mergers.  
 
Equity-financed mergers experience significant improvement in postmerger industry-adjusted 
cash flows. This conclusion is consistent with the finance theory which suggests that method 
of payment reveal information to the market. Stocks are preferred since value of equity 
frequently used in limiting overpayment, that is equity-financed mergers are inclined to 
overcome the informational asymmetry in the merger market (Hansen, 1987).  
 
According to research findings, bidders with high price-to-book ratios do not experience 
statistically significant cash flow improvements; whereas bidders with low price to book 
ratios are more prudent in their merger decisions. The poor performance of the growth bidders 
may be due to hubris and the failure of the market for corporate control to monitor their 
actions properly. 
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The combined size of bidder and targets are found to be effective on the postmerger 
performance of the mergers. Cash flows improve significantly in big-sized mergers, whereas 
small-sized mergers do not experience significant cash flow improvements after merger. The 
success of the big-sized mergers is apparently due to the close control of them by the market 
and other decision-makers (such as shareholders and board of directors) who have to approve 
the acquisition.  
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Table 5 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Business Overlap Subsets 
This table presents comparisons of empirical results for mergers divided to three subsamples according to overlap degree of mergers. The sample is divided into three subsets as high, medium, 
and low business overlap between the target and acquiring firms. High overlap mergers are merger cases between those bidder and target firms whose at least three first SIC Code numbers are the 
same, whereas in medium overlapping mergers the first two SIC Code numbers similar and in low overlapping mergers at maximum first SIC code number is similar. For each empirical proxy we 
give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to merger, the mean and median change in the 
proxy’s value for postmerger versus premerger period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change 
as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. Significance levels for subsets with total number of cases less than 10 are not reported. 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z -Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Cash Flows          
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
         
High Overlap 33 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.16 0.07 
(0.04) 
0.15 0.02 
(0.01) 
1.54* 0.64 1.39* 
Medium Overlap 4 0.01 
(0.00) 
6.67 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.37 0.75 0.50 
Low Overlap 19 0.02 
(-0,02) 
0.08 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 0.01 
(0.05) 
0.60 0.53 0.00 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
         
High Overlap 31 0.04 
(0.02) 
0.08 0.08 
(0.04) 
0.15 0.04 
(0.02) 
1.33* 0,61 1.08 
Medium Overlap 4 -0.05 
(-0.04) 
0.08 0.08 
(0.06) 
0.12 0.13 
(0.10) 
1.47 0.75 0.50 
Low Overlap 19 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.08 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.09 -0.01 
(0.00) 
0.36 0.53 0.00 
Cash Flow Components           
 
Return on Sales (ROS) 
         
High Overlap 33 -0.02 
(0.05) 
0.39 0.08 
(0.03) 
0.14 0.10 
(-0.02) 
1.28 0.58 0.70 
Medium Overlap 4 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.05 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.07 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.37 0.25 1.50 
Low Overlap 19 0.11 
(0.03) 
0.19 0.09 
(0.05) 
0.17 -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.32 0.58 0.46 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 5 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Business Overlap Subsets 
Continued 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Chi-Square -
Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
          
 
Asset Turnover (AT) 
         
High Overlap 33 0.08 
(-0.05) 
0.84 0.43 
(0.01) 
1.33 0.35 
(0.06) 
2.06** 0.67 1.74** 
Medium Overlap 4 -0.51 
(-0.31) 
0.70 -0.36 
(-0.11) 
0.67 0.15 
(0.20) 
1.10 0.75 0.50 
Low Overlap 19 -0.21 
(-0.22) 
0.53 -0.07 
(-0.10) 
0.39 0.14 
(0.12) 
1.33* 0.63 0.92 
Operating Efficiency          
 
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) 
         
High Overlap 33 59,845 
(23,432) 
122,931 102,027 
(44,540) 
202,879 42,182 
(21,108) 
2.46*** 0.70 2.09** 
Medium Overlap 4 218.874 
(56,038) 
361,623 81,501 
(78,974) 
42,212 -137,373 
(22,936) 
0.37 0.75 0.50 
Low Overlap 19 49,227 
(25,249) 
110,135 96,447 
(62,807) 
151,002 47,220 
(37,558) 
1.57* 0.53 0.00 
 
EBITD Efficiency (NIEFF) 
         
High Overlap 33 22,107 
(9,601) 
38,038 37,472 
(8,233) 
77,176 15,365 
(-1,368) 
1.30* 0.64 1.39* 
Medium Overlap 4 43,025 
(16,022) 
58,695 19,972 
(19,141) 
9.049 -23,053 
(3,119) 
0.37 0.75 0.50 
Low Overlap 19 29,016 
(5,798) 
48,534 31,529 
(11,426) 
51,575 2,513 
(5,628) 
1.57* 0.68 1.38* 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 5 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Business Overlap Subsets 
Continued 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Chi-Square -
Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Capital Investment          
 
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA) 
         
High Overlap 32 0.001 
(0.011) 
0.058 -0.005 
(0,004) 
0.080 -0.006 
(-0.007) 
0.08 0.47 0.53 
Medium Overlap 4 -0.004 
(0.003) 
0.024 -0.003 
(-0.002) 
0.020 0.001 
(-0.005) 
0.00 0.50 0.50 
Low Overlap 19 -0.001 
(0.010) 
0.048 -0.005 
(-0.003) 
0.061 -0.004 
(-0.013) 
0.36 0.47 0.46 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CETA) 
         
High Overlap 32 0.005 
(0.011) 
0.122 0.017 
(0.007) 
0.062 0.012 
(-0.004) 
1.70** 0.72 2.30** 
Medium Overlap 4 -0.020 
(-0.015) 
0.015 -0.013 
(-0.003) 
0.026 0.007 
(0.012) 
1.83 1.00 1.50 
Low Overlap 19 -0.014 
(-0.008) 
0.037 -0.008 
(-0.004) 
0.045 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.77 0.63 0.92 
Employment Cost          
 
Pension Expense per Employee (PEE) 
         
High Overlap 25 0.51 
(0.21) 
1.06 0.36 
(0.24) 
1.23 -0.15 
(0.03) 
0.26 0.44 0.40 
Medium Overlap 4 -0.04 
(-0.17) 
2.02 -0.07 
(0.17) 
1.33 -0.03 
(0.34) 
0.00 0.50 0.50 
Low Overlap 16 0.27 
(0.15) 
0.82 0.40 
(0.22) 
1.38 0.13 
(0.07) 
0.77 0.69 1.75** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 6 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Method of Payment Subsets 
This table presents comparisons of empirical results for mergers divided to three subsamples according to method of payment. We divide our sample into three subsets based on the method  of 
payment. The first subset is called equity-financed and includes merger cases where only the acquirer’s common stock was used to pay for an acquisition. The second subset is called cash-
financed and includes merger cases where only cash was used. The third subset is called mixed-financed and includes all other merger cases in which the payment terms were neither pure stock 
nor pure cash For each empirical proxy we give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to 
merger, the mean and median change in the proxy’s value for postmerger versus premerger period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the 
percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. Significance levels for subsets with total number of cases less than 10 are not reported.  
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerg
er Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z -Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Cash Flows          
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
         
Cash 12 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.08 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.04 -0.01 
(0.00) 
0.39 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 0.11 
(0.02) 
0.24 0.08 
(-0.01) 
0.18 0.45 0.60 
Equity  33 0.03 
(0.00) 
0.17 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06 0.01 
(0.04) 
1.92** 0.67 1.74* 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
         
Cash 12 0.05 
(0.06) 
0.1 0.17 
(0.10) 
0.22 0.12 
(0.04) 
1.57* 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 10 -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.06 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.06 0.04 
(0.00) 
1.58* 0.80 1.58* 
Equity  32 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.08 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.08 0.00 
(0.02) 
0.15 0.47 0.53 
Cash Flow Components 
 
Return on Sales (ROS) 
         
Cash 12 0.13 
(0.05) 
0.20 0.13 
(0.07) 
0.18 0.00 
(0.02) 
0.24 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.17 0.07 
(0.03) 
0.12 0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.27 0.55 0.09 
Equity  33 -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.40 0.07 
(0.03) 
0.14 0.08 
(-0.01) 
1.01 0.55 0.35 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 6 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Method of Payment Subsets 
Continued 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerg
er 
Median 
(Mean) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Chi-Square -
Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
          
 
Asset Turnover (AT) 
         
Cash 12 0.11 
(0.02) 
0.78 0.32 
(-0.05) 
1.82 0.21 
(-0.07) 
0.55 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 -0.07 
(-0,05) 
0,69 0.40 
(-0.04) 
1.34 
 
0.47 
(0.01) 
1.60* 0.73 1.21 
Equity  33 -0.12 
(-0.27) 
0.77 0.10 
(-0.03) 
0.55 0.22 
(0.24) 
2.31** 0.76 2.79*** 
 
Operating Efficiency 
         
 
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) 
         
Cash 12 68,058 
(24,770) 
161,422. 118,393 
(43,652) 
266,454 50,335 
(18,882) 
0.39 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 120,315 
(64,135) 
220,191 80,436 
(84,109) 
108,681 
 
-39,879 
(19,974) 
0.27 0.45 0.60 
Equity  33 49,864 
(23,432) 
109,223 97,572 
(46,108) 
160,768 47,708 
(22,676) 
3.08*** 0.79 3.13*** 
 
EBITD Efficiency (NIEFF) 
         
Cash 12 18,639 
(11,893) 
22,474 31,646 
(11,669) 
44,395 13,007 
(-224) 
.094 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 41,640 
(27,520) 
48,941 33,864 
(4,362) 
53,220 -7,776 
(-23,158) 
0.09 0.64 0.60 
Equity  33 23,371 
(6,515) 
46,027 35,250 
(11,126) 
77,034 11,879 
(4,611) 
1.89** 0.70 2.09** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 6 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Method of Payment Subsets 
Continued 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerg
er 
Median 
(Mean) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Chi-Square -
Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Capital Investment          
 
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA) 
         
Cash 12 -0.010 
(-0.001) 
0.061 -0.012 
(-0.003) 
0.063 -0.002 
(-0.002) 
0.24 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 0.016 
(0.019) 
0.045 0.011 
(0.015) 
0.102 -0.005 
(-0.004) 
0.36 0.55 0.09 
Equity  32 -0.002 
(0.010) 
0.051 -0.008 
(0.004) 
0.061 -0.006 
(-0.006) 
0.73 0.44 0.88 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CETA) 
         
Cash 12 -0.001 
(-0.002) 
0.003 -0.002 
(0.001) 
0.030 -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.47 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 11 0.007 
(-0.006) 
0.003 0.033 
(0.019) 
0.089 0.026 
(0.025) 
0.80 0.64 0.60 
Equity  32 -0.008 
(-0.009) 
0.123 0.000 
(-0.002) 
0.047 0.008 
(0.007) 
1.78** 0.75 2.65*** 
Employment Cost          
 
Pension Expense per Employee (PEE) 
         
Cash 8 -0.02 
(-0.23) 
1.47 -0.34 
(-0.37) 
1.14 -0.32 
(-0.14) 
1.26 0.58 0.29 
Mixed 8 0.53 
(0.39) 
0.93 0.49 
(0.54) 
1.98 -0.04 
(0.15) 
0.56 0.75 1.06 
Equity  29 0.44 
(0.16) 
1.00 0.48 
(0.32) 
1.03 0.04 
(0.16) 
0.29 0.55 0.74 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 7 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Value-Growth Subsets 
This table presents comparisons of empirical results for mergers divided to two subsets according to value-growth category of bidders. Mergers in growth category include bidders whose price-to-
book ratio are greater than or equal to the industry median. Mergers in value category include bidders whose price-to-book ratio is less than the industry median. For each empirical proxy we give 
the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to merger, the mean and median change in the 
proxy’s value for postmerger versus premerger period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change 
as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. Significance levels for subsets with total number of cases less than 10 are not reported.  
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z -Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Cash Flows          
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
         
“Value” Bidders  17 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.12 0.07 
(0.04) 
0.09 0.02 
(0.01) 
1.34* 0.76 1.94** 
“Growth” Bidders 39 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.14 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.13 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.89 0.54 0.32 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
         
“Value” Bidders  16 0.06 
(0.03) 
0.10 0.12 
(0.06) 
0.21 0.06 
(0.03) 
1.19 0.63 0.75 
“Growth” Bidders 38 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.07 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.07 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.78 0.58 0.81 
          
Cash Flow Components           
 
Return on Sales (ROS) 
  
 
  
 
     
“Value” Bidders  17 0.08 
(0.04) 
0.19 0.12 
(0.06) 
0.21 
 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.12 0.53 0.00 
“Growth” Bidders 39 0.01 
(0.04) 
0.38 0.09 
(0.04) 
0.13 0.08 
(0.00) 
1.10 0.56 0.64 
 
Asset Turnover (AT) 
         
“Value” Bidders  17 0.08 
(0.05) 
0.52 0.37 
(0.03) 
0.96 0.29 
(-0.02) 
1.73** 0.59 0.49 
“Growth” Bidders 39 -0.12 
(-0.22) 
0.83 0.13 
(-0.07) 
1.14 0.25 
(0.15) 
1.94** 0.69 2.24** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 7 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Value-Growth Subsets 
Continued 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Chi-Square -
Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Operating Efficiency          
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF)          
“Value” Bidders  17 28,092 
(29,755) 
60,212 34,161 
(44,540) 
76,508 6,069 
(14,785) 
0.73 0.59 0.49 
“Growth” Bidders 39 84,823 
(23,432) 
169,989 126,786 
(58,474) 
201,267 41,963 
(35,042) 
2.81*** 0.67 1.92** 
EBITD Efficiency (NIEFF)          
“Value” Bidders  17 19,131 
(5,572) 
34,173 20,301 
(4,057) 
39,931 1,170 
(-1,515) 
0.40 0.65 0.97 
“Growth” Bidders 39 28,915 
(10,649) 
46,183 40,267 
(14,103) 
74,301 11,352 
(3,454) 
2.15** 0.67 1.92** 
Capital Investment          
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA)          
“Value” Bidders  17 -0.024 
(-0.001) 
0.068 -0.020 
(-0.003) 
0.09 0.004 
(-0.002) 
0.45 0.53 0.00 
“Growth” Bidders 38 0.011 
(0.012) 
0.040 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.062 -0.009 
(-0.009) 
0.72 0.45 0.81 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CETA) 
         
“Value” Bidders  17 -0.018 
(-0.008) 
0.069 0.009 
(0.012) 
0.060 0.027 
(0.020) 
2.20** 0.82 2.43*** 
“Growth” Bidders 38 0.003 
(-0.006) 
1.676 0.005 
(-0.002) 
0.054 0.002 
(0.004) 
1.17 0.66 1.78** 
Employment Cost          
Pension Expense per Employee (PEE)          
“Value” Bidders  13 0.51 
(0.38) 
0.98 0.62 
(0.69) 
1.05 0.11 
(0.31) 
0.38 0.54 0.55 
“Growth” Bidders 32 0.32 
(0.12) 
1.12 0.23 
(0.11) 
1.35 -0.09 
(-0.01) 
0.60 0.53 0.53 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 8 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Combined Size Subsets 
This table presents comparisons of empirical results for mergers divided to two subsets according to total size of mergers. Big mergers include cases where combined bidder and target size is 
greater than or equal to the all mergers’ median. Small mergers include cases where total bidder and target size is less than all mergers’ median. Merger size is calculated as combined bidder and 
target size in the beginning of the year prior to announcement of the merger. For each empirical proxy we give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, standard deviation 
of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to merger, the mean and median change in the proxy’s value for postmerger versus premerger period, and a test of significance of the 
change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z -Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Cash Flows          
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
         
Small 28 0.07 
(0.04) 
0.17 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.07 -0.02 
(0.00) 
0.32 0.57 0.57 
Big 28 0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.08 
 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.15 0.05 
(0.03) 
1,91** 0.64 1.32* 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
         
Small 27 0.04 
(0.02) 
0.09 0.08 
(0.04) 
0.17 0.04 
(0.02) 
1.47* 0.63 1.15 
Big 27 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.10 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.26 0.56 0.38 
Cash Flow Components          
 
Return on Sales (ROS) 
  
 
  
 
     
Small 28 -0.02 
(0.04) 
0.43 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.14 0.08 
(0.00) 
0.55 0.54 0.19 
Big 28 0.08 
(0.05) 
0.10 0.08 
(0.05) 
0.10 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.68 0.57 0.57 
 
Asset Turnover (AT) 
         
Small 28 0.20 
(-0.01) 
0.84 0.32 
(-0.03) 
1.39 0.12 
(-0.02) 
0.91 0.61 0.94 
Big 28 -0.33 
(-0.27) 
0.54 0.08 
(-0.04) 
0.65 0.41 
(0.23) 
2.87*** 0.71 2.08** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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Table 8 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Combined Size Subsets 
Continued 
Variables N 
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Chi-Square -
Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Operating Efficiency          
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF)          
Small 28 41,778 
(23,759) 
121,428 99,740 
(60,640) 
197,148 57,962 
(36,881) 
2.80*** 0.75 2.46*** 
Big 29 93,425 
(28,108) 
167,633 96,648 
(30,987) 
159,513   3,223 
(2,879) 
1.14 0.54 0.19 
EBITD Efficiency (NIEFF)          
Small 28 15,203 
(7,838) 
29,758 26,679 
(11,168) 
44,821 11,476 
(3,330) 
2.14** 0.71 2.08** 
Big 29 36,688 
(10,125) 
51,098 39,566 
(11,276) 
81,904 2,878 
(1,151) 
0.89 0.61 0.94 
Capital Investment          
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA)          
Small 27 -0.009 
(0.013) 
0.061 -0.023 
(0.002) 
0.080 -0.014 
(-0.011) 
0.70 0.48 0.38 
Big 29 0.008 
(0.009) 
0.040 0.015 
(-0.001) 
0.057 0.007 
(-0.010) 
0.23 0.46 0.57 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CETA) 
         
Small 27 0.015 
(0.004) 
0.120 0.001 
(0.006) 
0.047 -0.014 
(0.002) 
0.53 0.67 1.54* 
Big 29 -0.022 
(-0.012) 
0.060 0.013 
(-0.004) 
0.064 0.035 
(0.008) 
2.46*** 0.75 2.46** 
Employment Cost          
Pension Expense per Employee (PEE)          
Small 20 0.44 
(0.10) 
0.87 0.77 
(0.48) 
1.27 0.33 
(0.38) 
1.01 0.40 0.67 
Big 26 0.32 
(0.16) 
1.22 -0.02 
(0.09) 
1.20 -0.34 
(-0.07) 
1.39* 0.64 1.60** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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